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Tocqueville's Typology and the Causes of the
Cuban Revolution
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I. INTRODUCTION
The France in which Tocqueville lived was one of extreme political
instability. The Revolution had ended the Ancien Regime, but neither
it nor any of the subsequent revolutions of the 19th Century were able
to bring order to the political life of the country. To Tocqueville it was
only one continuous process which manifested itself in periods of intense
activity broken by intervals of relative calm. He believed it to be the
efforts of the French Nation in producing a democratic political system.
This process of democratization was not only to be found in France;
Tocqueville believed that it could be discerned all across the continent.
Revolutionary activities and events were evidence of the process; as the
old institutions were destroyed to make way for the new, Europe was
moving toward an era of democracy.
In order to acquaint man with the nature of revolution, Tocqu eville
began to reflect and write upon the subject, especially as it pertained
to the French situation. His major effort was to be an analysis of the
French Revolution from its inception to his then contemporary period.
He was able to finish one volume in this series before his health failed
him; he died shortly thereafter, never completing the work.
The one volume on the Revolution of 1789 which he did finish has
been given various titles by the translators; it will be referred to in this
paper as the Ancien Regime. This book concerned itself with the nature
of French institutions prior to 1789 and the beginning of the French
Revolution. In addition to this book, Tocqueville's Recollections also
deals with revolution; here the subject is the Revolution of 1848. From
these two books can be drawn Tocqueville's theories or ideas as to how
and why a revolution occurs, the only result of his study which he was
able to present to the people.
He ordered his ideas as to the causes of revolution in a typology
which he presented in his Recollections. 1 It is never really mentioned in
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, translated
by Alexander Terxeriz de Maltos (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 64.
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the Ancien Regime, but his approach is one which utilizes the typology
presented in his earlier work. This framework set forth five major factors
which were important in producing a revolution: the nature of a country's institutions (political, social, and economic), the nature of a country's mouers (its cultural essence), antecedent facts, the state of mind
of a people, and chance. If social conditions were chaotic or "out of
balance" when one considered the nation's institutions, mouers, or state
of mind, then revolution would be a probable eventuality. Chance and
antecedent fact were supplementary in that they added to but did not
cause a revolutionary setting.
Tocqueville applied this framework to the French Revolution of
1789 and brought some understanding as to how and why this revolution came about. The purpose of this paper is to test Tocqueville's typology as a revolutionary frame of reference by using it to study the
recent Cuban experience. Each of the five factors will be explained and
then applied to the Cuban Revolution. An evaluation will then be attempted to determine if Tocqueville's typology is applicable and useful
in explaining the Cuban Revolution.
II. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S INSTITUTIONS
Tocqueville viewed the nature of a country's institutions-political,
social, and economic--as the foremost determinant of revolutions. 2 He
believed that a close relationship normally existed between the social
and political institutions. This relationship was a kind of balance in
which an elite occupied the top strata of both the political and social
hierarchies. This was an aristocratic notion in that he regarded this class
as an elite, but it was not to be an aristocracy based upon tradition or
birth. It was to be composed of those who qualified according to power,
ability, and the predisposition to use these two qualities in leading the
people. This elite enjoyed social privileges commensurate with its social
rank, but it paid for these privileges by serving the people as their
political head. The enjoyment of privilege was intolerable if those who
were privileged served no useful social or political functions, and a new
and cross-referenceable elite would be created through revolution if it
could not be created peacefully.
Batista's government was characterized not by the fact that the social elite participated in it, but by the fact that the government was
Batista. This condition was the product not only of the coup in 1952,
but also of the very nature of Cuban political history. Fed erico Gil has
2 Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville's Contributions To the Theory of Revolution",
Revolution: Nomos VIII, edited by Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press,
1966), p. 77.
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said that the condition of government in Cuba was the product of her
political heritage, the temperament of her people, the lack of civic training, and the apathy and absenteeism of the most capable and best
qualified of the citizenry; as a result politics went by default to the
corrupt and inept. 3 The social elite had abdicated its political position,
and ambitious politicians had filled the void with themselves. Batista
would be included in this list of ambitious men.
While it can be said that the Batista government was absolutist in
that one man held dictatorial power to which all others were subject,
it was still a government which reacted to some pressures. Batista knew
that it would be extremely difficult to hold power without some legitimizing support, and in order to provide this legitimacy, he created a
political party called the Progressive Action Coalition shortly after his
1952 cuartelazo. In addition, he allied himself with such groups as the
Church hierarchy, labor, and business, and he also maintained a modus
vivendi with some groups which normally would have been highly opposed to his government, such as the Cuban Communist Party. His main
source of support continued to be the army, however. In return for their
support, these various groups received satisfaction of their separate interests, a situation which forced Batista to consider their wishes. 4
While Batista's actions might have been based in part on popular
pressures or the particular interests of his supporters, he was still a dictator; what he decreed was what the government enforced. Such a form
of government violated the principle set forth by Tocqueville when he
spoke of the need for an elite which paid for its privileges by using its
superior ability to• lead the people. The social elite, either because of
Batista or its own unwillingness or incapacity, did not govern . This
discrepancy demanded adjustment, but Batista's regime was one in which
there could be no real inclusion of anyone else. The only access one
could have to the decision-making process was indirect and subject to
Batista's discretion. As Tocqueville believed it would, this lead to resentments and revolutionary pressures. The social and political elites
were not one, nor could there be any real movement toward this end
while Batista remained in power.
Apart from the political aspects of Tocqueville's concept of an elite,
one finds that the society and its structure offered little mobility, a necessary factor if the aristocracy was to be composed of only those who
served useful social functions. The society was divided into an upper
8 Federico Gil, "Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution," The Centennial Review, VI ( Summer, 1962), p. 373.
4
Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months With Castro (New York: World
Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 14, 18 and 22.
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and lower class whose boundaries were determined according to cultural
and functional characteristics. Possibly the main social determinant was
a consideration made as to one's economic function: those who performed
menial tasks were members of the lower class and those who hired others
to perform these tasks were members of the upper class.5 It was extremely difficult for a member of the lower class to reach a position
where he no longer had to perform menial tasks, but even if he did,
he had his aspirations blocked by cultural barriers such as education,
tastes, birth, and other considerations.
There was a middle-class which could be determined on the basis
of economic criteria, but it was almost non-existent as a social class. It
had no real sense of self-identification except possibly in the form of
deeply felt resentments produced by its frustrations. It was found almost exclusively in the urban areas, and it was composed of salaried
and skilled workers with some education, and of small shop-owners and
other small-scale self-employed individuals. 0 It had moderate economic
resources, but it aspired to be a part of the upper class, an aspiration
that was usually thwarted.
Politically and socially, then, there were individuals who were frustrated in their attempts to secure greater political power or social prestige; this was done without regard to their qualities or abilities. These
imbalances and frustrations produced, according to Tocqueville's typology, a revolutionary setting in Cuba.
The economy and its strengths or weaknesses is the last consideration found under the heading of the nature of a country's institutions.
Tocqueville was a pioneer in hypothesizing that economics and politics
were related. 7 He believed that if an economy were not able to meet
the needs of the people, then the people would seek change in the economic system; if peaceful change were not forthcoming, then they would
turn to revolutionary change, and this meant political upheaval.
The economic needs of the people might range from subsistence to
continued prosperity, depending on their aspirations. What the people
determined as their needs did not matter so much as that these perceived needs be met.
The Cuban economy was based on a monoculture-the
growing
and processing of sugar. Cuba was self-sufficient neither agriculturally
nor industrially. To pay for large amounts of imports, she depended on
the sale of her sugar crop in the world market, and especially in the
5 Wyatt MacGa:lfey and Clifford R. Barnett, Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its
Culture (New Haven, Connecticut: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962), p. 38.
o Ibid., p. 39.
.
7 Melvin Richter, p. 120.
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United States. Cuba's demand for imports rose, as did the prices paid
for these imports, in the period from 1920 until 1959, but the income
Cuba received from her sugar crop remained about the same ( her share
of the world sugar market dropped, but rising sugar prices prevented
an absolute decline in income from sugar sales) .8 This left Cuba with
a balance of payments deficit and a seriously threatened economy.
Diversification was needed to enable the Cuban economy to approach self-sufficiency or at least a position from which it could pay
for its imports. Approximately two-thirds of the Cuban economy was
tied in some way to the sugar crop,9 however, and the Cuban sugar crop
had a strangle-hold on the available capital needed to fund industrial
diversification. 10 The rate of foreign investment in Cuba was not sufficient to provide the funds necessary for diversification, and the need
for domestic investment was made chronic. Since the sugar-growers
opposed this, there was relatively little investment made in domestic
industry, and the economy of Cuba stagnated.
The most immediate failure of the economy to meet the needs of
the people lay not in the way in which income was produced, however,
but in the manner in which it was distributed. The upper-class was
wealthy, and it became wealthier year by year. The lower-class was
poor, and it would seem that it became poorer year by year. The per
capita income in Cuba was one of the highest in Latin America, but
many were extremely poor. 11
The rural working-class in 1959 lived under abominable conditions.
Their work was for the most part seasonal; the sugar crop utilized their
services for about five months of each year . For this they were paid a
per capita income of $91.00 per year. This salary enabled them to live
in an environment in which eleven percent drank milk, four percent ate
meat, forty percent had tuberculosis or intestinal parasites, less than
three percent had running water in their homes, and most lived in dirtfloored huts or shacks without electricity. These figures are made more
startling when it is revealed that they represent not only the peasants,
but all, including the rich, who lived in the rural areas. 12 The plight of
the sugar-worker was one which could engender deep resentments regarding the economic system.
Those who left the rural areas to find work in the cities fared little
better, if not worse. The Condereracion de Trabajadores de Cuba had
8

Wyatt MacGaffey, p. 11.
Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba, An American Dilemma (Washington, D. C.:
Luce, 1962), p. 74.
10
Hugh Thomas, "Origins of the Cuban Revolution," The World Today, XIX
(October, 1963), p. 452.
11
Lopez-Fresquet, p. 24.
12 Ibid., p. 10.
8
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worked for years to better the conditions of the employed laborer. Because of its political importance, it had been relatively successful . The
interests of the employed were protected to the extent that their gains
were not economically rational; this worked to retard economic development which would have provided more jobs for the unemployed. 13
The unemployed were forgotten or ignored by the government. Estimates of the rate of unemployment in the 1950's range from one-sixth
to one-fifth of the total labor force of the island.
It is obvious that the Cuban economy did not meet the needs of
the Cuban people. Not only was the economy subject to dangerous
:fluctuations, but a large segment of the population was forced to either
work at rural jobs which paid very little or run the risk of finding no
employment at all if they migrated to the cities. Tocqueville's typology
would clearly indicate that a major portion of the people were ready
for revolution upon economic grounds .
From the discussion of the different facets of the nature of the
Cuban institutions-political,
social, and economio-Tocqueville's typology indicates that a revolution in Cuba was imminent during Batista's
reign.
III. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S "MOUERS"
Tocqueville believed that any society had a body of opinions, emotions, beliefs, and premises which were a product of a culture and which
in tum created that particular culture. He called this cultural philosophy
or essence the mouers of a nation. They were not static qualities to be
described, but instead were dynamic forces or grand designs which
impelled a people fonvard ( or conceivably backward). He believed that
man needed these mouers in order to regulate his life and give it meaning within the social context. 14
Since mouers were so basic to the ordered operation of the social
system, there could be no conflict or competition between two or ·more
differing sets. Such a situation within a country would produce two or
more societies within its boundaries. This was incompatible, Tocqueville
believed, with the concept of a nation under one political head. Revolution was inevitable because the nation had to heal its schisms, and
this could be accomplished only with the disappearance of all but one
set of mouers.
In applying Tocqueville's concept to the Cuban situation, it is seen
that from the coup of Batista in 1952 until his departure from Cuba on
New Year's Eve, 1959, the nature of Cuban mouers was one in which
18
14

Ibid., p. 17.
Richter, pp. 80-94.
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revolution was an eventuality. Titis can be said to be so on the basis
of Cuban attitudes toward and acceptance of the Batista Regime.
At the time of the 1952 coup, "the greatest desire of the Cuban
people was to have an honest government." 15 There had been a long
history of revolutionary struggle for the freedom and efficiency of the
political system, and the administration of Carlos Prio Socorras has given
hope to these pressur es even though it had been somewhat corrupt and
inefficient. The people had had their interests taken into consideration
in the decision-making process, and elections had been relatively honest.
This was realized and appreciated by them, and it became a part of
their political culture in that they expected it to continue. 16
"The sin of Batista was to thwart the high hopes of a new generation by a return, or rather a continuance without hope of reform, of a
cynical and short-sided regime." 17 He had imposed himself and his
policies on a people who desired to be able to choose their leader and
the policies which this leader would implement. It was not a question
of two different sets mouers opposing one another; it was instead a
question of one man imposing his will upon a populace which did not
regard him as legitimate. Because of this, the nation's mouers ( or at
least their political content) called for public opposition to Batista.
Since Batista would not surrender his power without a fight, a revolution, according to the typology, was the only recourse.
Castro served as a point upon which much of the opposition to
Batista could find a basis for effective action. The question arises as to
whether fidelismo constituted a separate body of mouers in opposition
to that which was generally accepted to by the Cuban people. Apart
from the contemporary personalism of Castro, much of the fidelista
movement was based on concepts, ideas, or values which were traditional; th ey were and had been used by most Cuban politicians to gain
popular support. Such things as "governmental and economic reform"
were trite in that they were voiced by many, but they were adhered to
by few. It would seem that Castro's central position in the opposition
to Batista was due not to his ideology but to the fact that he was a
major opposition figure who commanded respect for non-ideological
reasons. As such, fidelismo could not really be termed an ideology or a
body or mouers.
Titis view is not without opposition. George I. Blankston, for instance, says that fidelismo was a rural movement against an urban
15
16
17

Rivero, p. 65.
Thomas, p. 453; MacGaffey, p. 124; and Lopez-Fresquet, p. 9.
Thomas, p. 453.
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Havana; 18 his argument is based on his observation that Castro set up
his revolutionary headquarters in rural Cuba where "the back country's
enemies of Havana :Bocked to him in an indigenous nationalism." 19
Others have also found fidelismo to encompass more than trite political
slogans and Castro's personalism.
Whether or not Castro presented the people with a set of competing mouers is irrelevant in the sense that Batista's seizure of power was
in opposition to the political mouers of the people. This fact is proof
enough that the Cuban mouers were being frustrated. Since the mouers
of a people are dynamic in that they guide the actions and reactions of
society, there could be no solution to the problem until the conditions
causing this frustration were destroyed.
IV. CHANCE AND ANTECEDENT

FACT IN CUBA

Tocqueville believed that two supplementary factors of revolution
were to be found in the events or conditions preceding this type of
social action. These differed from his other classifications in that they
encompassed all prior conditions not classifiable under the other three
generalizations. These two causes were antecedent fact and chance.
Antecedent fact was the term used to describe those events or conditions which contributed to the revolutionary setting, but which were
not causes for revolution in and of themselves. Antecedent fact made
revolution a more likely eventuality by adding to the background which
provid ed the people with their reasons for insurrection.
Chance was the term used to describe an event or condition which
enabled a revolution to occur. It did nothing which had not b een prepared beforehand, but it could provide the circumstances which would
draw together those different pressures and frustrations that would lead
to revolution. 20
In applying the concept of antecedent fact to the Cuban situation,
three major considerations stand out. These are Batista's seizure of
power, his suspension of civil liberties, and the disintegration of Batista's
army.
When Batista seized power in 1952, he created perhaps the most
basic antecedent fact. This can be said because his action did not add
to a revolutionary setting, but instead created its raison d'etre.
18 George I. Blankston, "Fidelism And Its Origin," Latin Am erican Politics,
edited by R. D. Tomasek (Garden City, New York: Doubl eday and Co., 1966),
pp. 359-362.
19 Ibid., p. 361.
20 Tocqueville, p. 64.
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Batista's suspension at various times of the civil and political liberties of the people also caused opposition. When Batista came to power,
he suspended the Constitution and dissolved Congress. In the wake of
public disorder after Cash·o's "History Will Absolve Me" speech, Batista
was forced to suspend political and civil rights under a public order
law which prohibited anti-government speech or actions. Later these
acts were partially repealed. Elections were held and Congress reconvened, and the p eople had some of their civil and political rights restored. These moves, however, were designed to create support for
Batista while still allowing him to control the opposition to his regime.
There were other suspensions of the civil and political rights of the
Cuban people, and there were other "repeals" of these actions. Personal
rights and constitutional safeguards were tenuous even while the people
enjoyed the nominal restoration of these privileges. Arrests were made
without regard to legality, and people were murdered and tortured by
the authorities in defiance of all law, including that decreed publicly by
Batista. 21 Legality suffered most in Oriente Province and Santiago; it is
interesting to note that it was here that the greatest opposition to
Batista's regime was engendered. 22
The disintegration of Batista's army is also an example of antecedent fact. Following the failure of the general strike which Castro called
against Batista, the Cuban Govemment announced that "the rebel movement was dying"; at the same time, the government ordered a massive
army offensive to hasten this end. The offensive ended in failure; by
Christmas, 1958, the rebels were in a position to move out of the mountains and march on the towns. 23
This came about because the army had disintegrated as a fighting
force. The army had suffered heavy and demoralizing casualities in its
massive offensive; these had come not in open fighting, but in ambushes
and by sniper-fire. More important, however, was the fact that the army
was a major tool of repressive force for Batista; this had caused a decline in military morale, for as the government increasingly relied on
repressive and brutal tactics to stop the guerilla movement, the soldiers
increasingly became dissatisfied with their part in implementing these
policies.M In addition to the dissatisfaction with the policies which they
were expected to implement, the army was further demoralized by rumors that some of their commanding officers were negotiating secretly
21
R. Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Oblensky,
1959), p. 310.
22 Ibid., p. 320.
28 Rivero, _pp. 42-43.
2
4- MacGaffey, p. 136.
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with Castro. 25 Other high army officials were arrested and imprisoned
for plotting to overthrow Batista and institute a constitutional government , and this also hurt the morale of th e army. 26 The result of these
considerations was the collapse of the major basis of Batista's support. 27
The seizure of power by Batista, and the subsequent suspensions
of constitutional rights, served to anger and frustrate the people. In this
way th ey added to the revolutionary setting. The disintegration of the
army, even though it did not contribute to revolutionary feeling, did
have an effect on Batista's political survival. It was antecedent fact in
the sense that the army's ability was destroyed by its demoralization,
and this contributed to the revolutionary setting by removing a major
obstacle to the revolutionaries.
Whil e th e flight of Batista might also be considered as antecedent
fact, it is a good example of Tocqueville's concept of chance. It was the
opportunity which enabl ed Castro to seize power. When Batista fled the
country, he left a power vacuum which Castro filled as rapidly as he
could.
Both antec edent fact and chance were then pr esent in the revolutionary setting of Cuba in 1959.
V. THE STATE OF MIND OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE
According to Tocqueville, a revolution may come about when the
institutions of a society do not fit its needs, or it may come about when
the mouers of the people are in some degre e of conflict. In either case,
Tocquevill e believed that the state of mind of the p eople must be of a
nature which would allow the people to accept revolutionary actions as
a means to promote or protect their int erests. This feeling might be
latent or overt, but it had to be present. In its absence , what otherwise
might be a revolution became no more than a coup d'etat.
Batista's reaction to the revolutionary activities of Castro in the last
years of his regime was to institute a reign of t error; this served to
unite the people against him. Castro presented the picture of a "a David
challenging Goliath", and this so caught the imagination of the people
that they rallied to his support. 28 This was especially so in the rural areas.
Castro's support in the cities came from the professional and whitecollar workers, as well as from the students. Originally his support had
come solely from the young people who had engineer ed and imple2s Rivero,

p. 43.
MacGaffey, p. 244.
2 1 Rivero, p. 29.
28 Gary MacEoin, Latin America, The Eleventh Hour (New York: P.
and Sons, 1962), p. 99.
26
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roented a terrorist campaign in his support after his return from Mexico.29
Others had since been alienated by Batista to the point that they support ed Castro . Castro had the backing of most teach ers, writers, doctors,
lawyers, engineers, and office-workers; these people formed what middleclass existed, and they also formed a part of the upper-class. In return
for their support , Castro espoused goals which corresponded to how
these peopl e felt. so Political freedom , free elections, and social justice
were synonym ous with Castro and his movement.
Havan a, how ever, had a large segment of its population which was
pro-Batista. When Castro called a general strike in 1958, it failed in
Havana because only a small part of the people supported the rebels.
Havana was not like the rest of Cuba; "commerce and industry still
clung to Batista " in the capital. 81
By Janu ary 1, 1959, howev er, this had changed . Until that time
there had been a great deal of political apathy, but now the people
supporte d Castro or at least opposed Batista. 8 2 This quick change in the
sentim ent of th e p eople "could only be explained by the national feeling
of revulsion for the existing political habits." 88
From apathy , the Cuban people developed openly anti-Batista attitud es. While not all people supported Castro, most were united in their
opposition to Batista. The state of mind of the Cuban people in 1959
was one in which th ey were ready for revolution.
VI. CON CL USION
Each of the five concepts in Tocqueville's typology prescrib es revolution when it is applied to the Cuban situation. The nature of the
country's institutions and mouers was such that change had to come.
There were examples of antecedent fact and chance which added to
the revolution ary setting. The state of mind of the people was one in
which there was almost universal opposition to Batista.
Tocqueville's typology does not, however, explain the Cuban Revolution. It can be used to order the study of the chaotic conditions in
Cub a prior to 1959, but the real revolution came later, and the typology
is not applic able in this later setting. Th e major factor in the Cuban
Revolution is th e personality of Fidel Castro , a factor which cannot be
fitted into the typology.
29

Phillips, p . 291.

so Rivero, p. 76.
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Phillips, pp. 352-353.
Ib id., p . 383.
Gil, p. 385.
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A re-evaluation of the state of mind of the peopl e is important at
this point for two reasons. First, the other conditions found revolution ary under Tocqueville's typology are conditions which can be duplicated
in other countries. In these other countries , however, no revolution has
occurred. In addition, those conditions were present in Cuba long before Batista was overthrown, but there was no revolution or ouster of
Batista until the people were in opposition to him and were no longer
apathetic. In other words, Batista was not overthrown until the state of
mind of the people was one of open opposition, regardless of what
other social, economic, or political problems existed. Second, the state
of mind of the people was one which sought a democratic form of
government, not a program of sweeping economic and social change .
Castro took cognizance of this fact and initially present ed moderate
goals for his movement. These two considerations indicate that the state
of mind of the people was the determining factor which enabled Batista
to be overthrown, but that it called only for a political revolution and
not the social and economic revolution for which the other concepts in
Tocqueville's typology called.
The people received in 1959 what they sought in 1958; Batista was
gone and a new government which promised democratic reform was
instituted in his place. That even this was a revolution is questiona ble.
Suarez says that if a revolution means a fundamental change in the
institutions of a country, "then in January 1959 there was no revolutionary situation in Cuba." 3 At this time, Castro was simply a continuation
of Batista and all the others who had controlled the island from time
to time. He was just another military dictator in a nation whose history
was characterized by political insurrection and military dictators. 85 That
his support came from other sectors of society as well as from his Rebel
Army does not alter this fact.
The Cuban Revolution was more than just a change of those in
power, however, as can clearly be seen by the changed nature of the
society and economy in Cuba today. The answer to the question of why
or how did the Cuban Revolution come about lies in Fidel Castro, an
aspect of revolution not observed by Tocqueville. Castro's control of the
revolutionary movement was a product of his charismatic leadership
rather than institutionalized relationships. 86 In order to protect this charismatic leadership, Castro opposed the "institutionalization" of his government or of his revolutionary movement. He sought to protect and
4,

3 4, Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966. ( Cambridge:
The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 34.
s5 Blankston, pp. 352-354.
8 6 Gil, p. 392.
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strengthen his personal appeal to the masses. Suarez feels that after
Castro became Prime-Minister in 1959, he either had to implement a
return to the "democracy" before Batista or take a revolutionary path,
a path that would justify holding on to revolutionary power. 37 Whether
or not Castro was forced into it by conditions, be began unilaterally
and incrementally to radicalize the revolutionary movement during 1959.
In setting this process in motion, Castro used his personal power and
appeal to initially obtain the program's acceptance by the people.
This radicalization prev ented the institutionalization of the Cuban
government in that Castro became the harbinger of a new social and
economic order for the masses; elections were postponed, and rival
power centers were rendered impotent. Through these actions, Castro
not only maintained his personal power over and appeal to the Cuban
people, but he may very well have increased them. This would be difficult to prove because be alienated much of the middle and upper classes
whose support for him had been based on their desire to overthrow
Batista and institute a democratic government rather than to embark
on sweeping social and economic change. In any event, Castro maintained complete control over his revolution and his government by leading the nation into a program of social and economic change. The extent of this social and economic change was to form the Cuban Revolution.
As already stated, Tocqueville's typology does not explain why the
revolution did not occur earlier ( either before or immediately after
Batista's overthrow), nor does it explain why one man was able to
bring it into being. The French Revolution occurred in the Eighte enth
and Nineteenth Centuries, and the Cuban Revolution occurred in the
Twentieth Century, but it would be foolish to expect their differences
to end with that consideration. The result of Tocqueville's study of
France is useful in that it provides general understanding about the
social phenomena which are referre d to as revolution, but it cannot, at
least in the Cuban example, explain the "how" and the "why" of these
occurrences. This is something that perhaps must be determined by a
specific study of a specific revolutionary situation, the same approach
which, it should be said, Tocqu eville used in explaining the French
experience.
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